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This paper investigates the nature of the remarkable surge in individual membership of the 
Labour Party after the general election of May 2015, particularly after Jeremy Corbyn was 
officially nominated as a candidate for the leadership in June of that year. Using both British 
Election Study (BES) and Party Members Project (PMP) data, we explain the surge by 
focusing on the attitudinal, ideological and demographic characteristics of the members 
themselves. Findings suggest that, along with support for the leader and yearning for a new 
style of politics, feelings of relative deprivation played a significant part: many 'left 
behind' voters (some well-educated, some less so) joined Labour for the first time when a 
candidate with a clearly radical profile appeared on the leadership ballot. Anti-capitalist and 
left-wing values mattered too, particularly for those former members who decided to return to 










Researchers have been documenting the decline of grassroots political parties across 
the advanced democracies for nearly three decades (Katz et al. 1992; Mair, 1994; Scarrow, 
2000; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Dalton, 2005; Heidar, 2006; Van Biezen, et al., 2012). 
This trend, variously attributed both to supply and demand side factors (van Haute and Gauja, 
2015: 4-6), is important because political parties, even if they are seen by many as little better 
than ‘necessary evils’ (see Ignazi, 2017), continue to play a central role in the effectiveness of 
democracy. Notwithstanding the greater participatory rights of party members (Faucher, 
2014; Scarrow, 2015; Webb et al. 2017; Fisher et al., 2014), a decline in their numbers has 
important implications for the future of democracy (Scarrow, 1996; Dalton and Wattenberg, 
2000; Webb et al., 2002; Gauja, 2015).   
 In Britain, however, things have changed. Whether temporary or permanent, all of the 
major political parties, with the exception of the Conservatives, have seen a recent reversal of 
this decline. Trends in membership for all the major parties over the period 2002 to 2016 
appear in Figure 1, and show that in the case of the SNP, UKIP and the Greens the revival 
started in the midterm of the 2010-2015 Coalition, while in the case of Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats it followed the 2015 general election. The most striking development is 
undoubtedly the rapid growth in Labour’s membership during the leadership campaign of 
2015 that ended with the election of veteran left-winger, Jeremy Corbyn.     
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 The study of factors that lead people to join parties is certainly not new (see van 
Haute and Gauja, 2015: 8). In this paper, however, we try specifically to explain the nature of 
the resurgence in Labour party membership. As of January 2018, Labour had 552,000 
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members, a massive increase on the 198,000 recorded prior to the 2015 election (see 
Audickas, et al., 2018). 
 Such a reversal of Labour’s membership decline has happened before, even if it 
eventually turned out to be short-lived – most obviously following Tony Blair’s successful 
leadership bid in 1994 (Seyd and Whiteley, 2002).  The Blair blip, however, did not approach 
anything like that seen since 2015. But while media coverage can give the impression that 
those who joined are one homogenous, predominantly youthful mass, not all of them share 
the same profile, as we show below.  Most obviously, some have joined the party for the first 
time, while others have returned to it after a prolonged absence.  
This study comprises two parts. In the first, we use British Election Study (BES)1 data 
to look at the factors driving the surge in these two types of membership. We test six related 
hypotheses examining differences between long-established and returning members on the 
one hand, and new joiners on the other. We then develop two additional hypotheses, using 
Party Members Project (PMP) 2 data, on the determinants of support for Jeremy Corbyn who, 
the findings generated by BES data suggest, played a crucial role in driving the rapid growth 
of membership after he became a leadership candidate.   
The BES data allows us to compare different types of party member, while the PMP 
data permits us to probe the views of party members more closely, particularly in relation to 
their attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn and the timing of their decision to join or re-join the party.  
We begin by reviewing the literature on why people join (or re-join) political parties before 
focusing on Labour’s recent revival. 
Why Do People Join Political Parties? 
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There are a number of models of political participation (Verba et al., 1995; Parry, et 
al., 1992), several of which have been applied to the task of explaining why people join 
parties (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002; Scarrow 2015; Gauja, 2015). 
 Some of these models relate to long-term social processes and rely on variables such 
as social class, education and community cohesion which change slowly over time – for 
instance, the Civic Voluntarism (Verba et al., 1995) and Social Capital models (Putnam 
2000). The former stresses the importance of individual resources and the latter community 
resources as drivers of participation.  Clearly, the rise in Labour’s membership after the 2015 
general election cannot be fully explained by these relatively slow moving social processes, 
as membership more than doubled within just a few months. 
 That said, two theoretical models would seem to be particularly relevant for 
understanding the surge in Labour’s membership. One, the General Incentives Model (GIM), 
was developed at the time of the first surveys of party members in Britain (Seyd and 
Whiteley, 1992). This model is based on the idea that actors respond to a variety of incentives 
when they participate in politics. It combines variables associated with rational choice 
theories, which focus on the costs and benefits of participation, with social-psychological 
measures, such social norms and ideological beliefs which help to motivate individuals to get 
involved. Unfortunately, the model includes many variables which are not available in BES 
surveys. In addition, some of the variables in the model, such as perceptions of benefits and 
costs, are unlikely to change in a matter of months. For these reasons we do not directly test 
the theory in the present paper, although it has been discussed in other research (Poletti et al., 
2018).  
 The second model of interest here is based on relative deprivation theory originally 
introduced by Stouffer et al. (1949) and subsequently developed by Runciman (1966). This 
theory is based on the idea that individuals develop expectations as to how economic, 
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political and social systems should treat them in relation to issues of equity and fairness.  At 
the same time they also develop judgements about how they are actually treated in practice.  
The greater the gap between expectations and evaluations, and the more negative the 
comparisons, the more likely they are to experience frustration and anger (Walker and Smith, 
2002).  This theory can be tested using BES data.  
These emotional responses are a ‘potent, volatile, instigator of action’ (Marcus et al., 
2000: 26) and a stimulus to obtaining and processing information in order to try to explain 
and, if possible, change these negative comparisons (Conover and Feldman, 1986; Marcus, 
1988): ‘If the evaluation proves to be negative, the individual experiences relative deprivation 
and is motivated to one of several possible behaviours, ranging from changing membership in 
the negatively evaluated group to changing the dimensions of comparison’ (Walker and 
Pettigrew 1984: 302).  
 The context in which comparisons are made is a key factor in understanding how 
relative deprivation works to stimulate political action (Runciman, 1966, p.9) since it depends 
on people’s attributions of responsibility. Blaming negative comparisons on oneself can lead 
to withdrawal and apathy, whereas attributing them to the organisation of society and the 
political system can stimulate participation. Such attributions motivate people to participate 
in political parties, social movements, and politics more generally (Walker and Smith, 2002; 
see also Sniderman et al., 1991). Blaming the political system is likely to have become 
particularly salient after the Great Recession, and recent research suggests that relative 
deprivation played an important role in explaining the rise in party membership and electoral 
support for UKIP after the 2010 general election (Clarke et al., 2017). 
 Accordingly, we examine the surge in Labour party membership, particularly after 
Jeremy Corbyn became the party leader, with the assistance of relative deprivation theory.  
The central argument is that relative deprivation drove Labour’s membership revival but that 
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its effects were conditional on two additional inter-related variables, namely ideology and 
attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn himself. The shift to the left associated with his leadership and the 
promise of a new style of politics ensured that feelings of relative deprivation mobilised new 
members to join the party who otherwise might have remained apathetic and uninvolved. We 
now move on to a close examination of the changes in Labour party membership after the 
2015 general election and how these related to relative deprivation and other measures. 
 
Labour’s membership surge 
We start with the ‘Relative Deprivation’ hypothesis: 
H1: People who joined the Labour Party for the first time after the 2015 election were 
more likely to feel a sense of relative deprivation than those who were already members or 
who were re-joining the party. 
This hypothesis implies that different types of recruits will compare themselves with 
different reference groups.  Low-income, low-status and poorly-educated recruits are likely to 
compare themselves with other working class people in similar situations to themselves.  In 
contrast, graduate recruits are likely to compare themselves with other graduates and, if this 
comparison makes them feel ‘left behind’ by their peers, it will act as a spur to political 
action, not least because education gives individuals a greater sense of political efficacy and 
provides skills which are valuable for stimulating political participation (see Verba et al., 
1995).  In other words, they are less likely to become apathetic by blaming themselves for 
their circumstances. This logic leads the ‘Educated Left-Behind’ hypothesis: 
H2: Graduates who joined the Labour Party for the first time after the 2015 election 
were more likely to feel a sense of relative deprivation than graduates who were already 
members or who were re-joining the party. 
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While it is widely recognised that the spread of socially liberal, cosmopolitan and 
post-materialist values in Western societies since the 1960s (Inglehart 1997) has generated a 
‘silent counter-revolution’ of authoritarian attitudes (Ignazi 1992; Stenner 2005; Haidt 2013),  
those on the left who feel ‘left-behind’ and deprived may share this suspicion of 
cosmopolitan values, but frame things differently from those on the right; they are less likely 
to see the danger as coming not from immigration, but from predatory international 
capitalism and social inequality caused by globalisation – an analysis characteristic of, for 
instance, those involved with the ‘Occupy Movement’ which grew up following the Great 
Recession (Gitlin, 2012).  As previous studies have shown, anti-capitalist values are not 
necessarily correlated with where people place themselves on the left-right spectrum. UKIP 
members, for instance, are on the right of British politics but are also strongly anti-capitalist 
in their beliefs where their focus is on corporate capitalism (see Clarke et al., 2017: 101-102). 
This logic suggests a third hypothesis: 
H3: People who joined the Labour Party for the first time after the 2015 election were 
more likely to be influenced by anti-capitalist values than were returning and existing 
members. 
We next consider the relationship between relative deprivation and attitudes to Jeremy 
Corbyn and also the role of ideology. When he became a leadership candidate in 2015, 
Corbyn was an outsider who had been associated with the far left for many years.  He had 
little support in the parliamentary party and was only able to enter the membership ballot 
because of nominations provided by Labour MPs who wanted a wide range of views to be 
represented in the contest but made it clear they would not vote for him. In the event, and 
with the help of a highly sophisticated social media-savvy campaign spearheaded by 
grassroots activists – an organisation which then rebranded itself as Momentum and became 
in effect Corbyn’s praetorian guard – he won the leadership contest by taking 59.5 percent of 
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the votes among party members and registered supporters in the first preference ballot in 
September 2015. This victory was repeated when he was challenged for the leadership by 
Owen Smith MP in the summer of 2016. These events almost certainly inspired new 
members to join and former members to return to the party in order to support and effectively 
protect the new leader. We therefore offer the fourth hypothesis as follows:  
H4: People who joined the Labour Party for the first time or returned to the party 
after the 2015 election were more likely to support Jeremy Corbyn than those who were 
already members at the time of the 2015 election.    
Was there, though, any difference between those who returned to the Labour Party 
and those who joined the party for the first time? Our fifth hypothesis addresses this question. 
During Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’ years the party arguably swung significantly to the right 
(Shaw, 1996; Driver and Martell, 1998; Gould, 1998; Seyd and Whiteley, 2002) – indeed, by 
1997 the party was positioned to the right of the Liberal Democrats on the left-right ideology 
scale constructed from party manifesto data (Budge et al. 2001). We hypothesise that many 
people who re-joined the Labour party after the 2015 election were returning members who 
had left the Party during the Blair/Brown era because they were disillusioned by the sort of 
‘centre ground’ politics typified by New Labour. They re-joined Labour because they were 
attracted by radical left-wing policies proposed by Jeremy Corbyn as an answer to the 
challenges of modern society. Although some of the first-time joiners might have been 
attracted by those policies as well, ideology was more likely to be a driver for returning 
members, given their well-established radical positions. This possibility gives rise to what we 
shall call the ‘Left-Wing Ideology’ hypothesis: 
H5: Members who returned to the Labour Party after the 2015 elections were likely to 
be significantly more left-wing than existing members or first-time joiners. 
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If radical left-wing ideology is what attracted returning members, we suggest that new 
members tended to come from a slightly different position: one of political cynicism and 
disillusion with ‘politics as usual’. Corbyn offered not only a sharp swing to the left but the 
rhetoric of a new style of politics that would encourage members to work for the selection of 
left-wing candidates for party offices and parliament, and actively to participate in policy-
making. In other words, Corbyn aimed at turning Labour’s grassroots into a new social 
movement (Bush, 2017). We argue that these developments are likely to have addressed the 
belief that politicians do not care about ordinary people and attracted a new kind of member 
to the party. These developments give rise to a sixth hypothesis: 
H6: People who joined the Labour party for the first time after 2015 were more likely 
to be disillusioned with ‘politics as usual’ and to want a new style of politics, compared with 
returning and existing members.   
How are hypotheses four, five and six related to relative deprivation theory? Liking 
Jeremy Corbyn, being on the left of the party and being disillusioned with politics as usual 
can be motivated by a variety of things, but relative deprivation plays an important role in all 
of them. The implementation of austerity measures by the Coalition government and the 
resultant stagnation in real wages combined with the ongoing rise of the so-called ‘gig 
economy’ and the increased shortage of affordable housing are all background factors. In 
particular, it has been shown that a growing gap between people’s evaluations of their own 
economic circumstances (improving very slowly) and that of the country as a whole 
(supposedly improving faster) was a key driver in the rise in support for UKIP in the run-up 
to the 2015 general election (Clarke et al., 2017: 125). Thus, relative deprivation triggered 
political action among people with positive attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn, who think of 
themselves as left-wing and who feel disillusioned with politics as usual. These factors all 
working together helped to trigger changes in party membership during this period.  
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BES data and membership type 
We can test these six hypotheses about the types of party member – those with 
existing membership dating from before the 2015 general election and those who joined as 
part of the post-election surge, whether returning to the party or as first-time joiners - using 
data from waves 6 and 8 of the 2015 BES internet panel.  These two waves asked questions 
about party membership. Wave 6 was conducted immediately after the general election of 
2015 and wave 8 was in the field a year later in May and June 2016, so they are ideally timed 
to identify the new members recruited by Labour during this period. The questions asked 
about the respondent’s current and previous membership.   
 The large samples make it possible to identify a total of 651 Labour party members in 
the 2015 wave of the survey and 860 members in the 2016 wave.3 Some 58 percent of 
Labour’s usable sample of 2016 (n=457) members were also members in 2015. In addition, 
25 percent (n=194) had never been a member of a party before, but joined during the period 
between the two waves of the survey.  Finally, 18 percent (n=140) had been a member prior 
to 2015 but had left the party only to re-join it by 2016.  So, we can identify existing, first-
time joiners and returning members of the party in the 2016 wave of the survey.4    
 
Results: Explaining Labour’s membership surge 
We start by exploring the relationship between the type of party member in the 2016 
survey and their social background characteristics, looking for evidence of ‘relative 
deprivation’ impacting first-time joiners. Table 1 examines social grade, educational status, 
gender and age, whereas Table 2 looks at income and fear of poverty. The pattern which 
emerges suggests that, with some exceptions, existing and returning members were more like 
each other than those joining the party for the first time. Just under a quarter of the returning 
members were middle class professionals (social grade A), which is similar to the 22 percent 
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of existing members. In contrast, only 15 percent of the first-time joiners were in this 
category. At the other end of the scale, about 14 percent of returning members were in the 
‘working class’ DE category – again about the same as the existing members, but nearly a 
fifth of the first-time joiners were in these categories.   
 The same pattern emerges in relation to education, with 56 percent of the existing 
members and 61 percent of the returning members being graduates, compared with only 40 
percent of the new members. Gender is an exception to this pattern since 61 percent of 
existing members were male compared with only 49 percent of returning members and 51 
percent of new members. Finally, not surprisingly, returning members were older on average 
(at 61) than the new joiners (52) and existing members (56). 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The income data in Table 2 shows a similar pattern and it particularly suggests that 
the new members may be more susceptible to feelings of relative deprivation than the 
existing or returning members. In April 2016 the average salary in Britain was £27,500 per 
annum (ONS, 2016).  Some 31 percent of existing Labour party members had household 
incomes below £25,000, as did 32 percent of returning members.  By contrast, a striking 42 
percent of the first-time joiners were in this group. Overall, these new recruits were less 
educated, less likely to work in high status occupations and had incomes well below those of 
existing members or those who returned to the party after the general election. In other 
words, the ‘objective’ conditions for creating a sense of relative deprivation were more 
apparent among the new members than they were among members in general. 
 However, poverty and low incomes do not automatically generate feelings of relative 
deprivation: the context in which people make judgements also matters. Such feelings are 
tapped in the survey by the question, ‘During the next 12 months, how likely or unlikely is it 
that there will be times when you don't have enough money to cover your day to day living 
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costs?’5 Even though it does not ask respondents to make direct comparisons with other 
groups, this is a reasonable proxy measure since it goes some way to capturing the 
psychological dimension of feeling deprived or left behind.6 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 The second sub-table of Table 2 shows that ‘fear of poverty’ was significantly greater 
among the first-time joiners than among existing and returning members. Some 37 percent of 
the first-time joiners reported that lack of money is fairly or very likely to be a problem in the 
future, compared with just 16 percent of returning members and 19 percent of existing 
members – a very striking difference. Not surprisingly, low income is likely to trigger a 
greater fear of poverty in the future for the first-time joiners, thereby supporting H1, namely 
that Labour’s new recruits were more likely to feel a sense of relative deprivation about their 
position in society than party members in general.   
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 The second hypothesis spins off the first, but narrows the focus to graduates: 
Graduates who joined the Labour Party for the first time after the 2015 election were more 
likely to feel a sense of relative deprivation than graduates who were already members or 
who were re-joining the party. Table 3 shows that the graduate new recruits and returning 
members are rather similar to each other with around 37 percent of the former and 31 percent 
of the latter on below average incomes as opposed to less than a quarter of existing members. 
These findings are largely consistent with H3, and indicate that the objective conditions for 
creating a sense of relative deprivation were more apparent among Labour’s new graduate 
recruits and its returning members than among the existing graduate members. Table 3 also 
shows that the pattern seen in the first hypothesis extends to the subjective measure of 
relative deprivation, fear of poverty. Only about a fifth of the existing graduate and returning 
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graduate members thought that they would have difficulty making ends meet in the future, 
compared with a third of the first-time graduate joiners. This finding is also consistent with 
H2. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 The third hypothesis concerns the idea that first-time joiners were more likely than 
other members to have anti-capitalist values. An anti-capitalist values scale was created by 
summing the responses to three Likert scaled items in the survey (alpha=0.75).  Respondents 
were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: ‘Big business takes 
advantage of ordinary people’; ‘There is one law for the rich and another for the poor’; 
‘Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance’. The 
correlation between left-right self-placement and anti-capitalist attitudes is modest (r=-0.30) 
and so these values are not plainly identical to ideological self-placement. Table 6 examines 
the mean scores for the different categories of party member on the scale where a high score 
denotes strong agreement with the statements. As expected, the first-time joiners were 
considerably more anti-capitalist than existing and returning members, confirming H3.   
Turning to the relationship between membership type and the popularity of Jeremy 
Corbyn, H4 states that people who joined the Labour Party for the first time or returned to 
the party after the 2015 election were more likely to support Corbyn than those who were 
already members at the time of the 2015 election). Support for Corbyn is measured by an 11-
point ‘likeability’ scale where zero means ‘strongly dislike’ and ten means ‘strongly like’. 
The results in Table 4 show that the returning members were most enthusiastic about Corbyn, 
followed by the first-time joiners, who in turn were more supportive of him than the existing 
members, all of which supports H4. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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In relation to ideology, the surveys include a question asking respondents to locate 
themselves on an 11-point left-right ideological scale where zero means ‘very left-wing’ and 
ten means ‘very right-wing’. Thus, it is possible to calculate the mean scores for the different 
types of member on the scale; results appear in Table 5. It is apparent that the first-time 
joiners and existing members have rather similar scores on this scale, whereas the returning 
members are significantly more left-wing than their counterparts. This finding lends credence 
to the idea that the shift to the left by Labour under Corbyn has brought back a number of 
people who abandoned the party during the Blair/Brown era, confirming H5 (members who 
returned to the Labour Party after the 2015 election were likely to be significantly more left-
wing than existing members or first-time joiners).7 
H6 states that people who joined the Labour party for the first time after 2015 were 
more likely to be disillusioned with ‘politics as usual’ and want a new style of politics, as 
advocated by Jeremy Corbyn, compared with returning and existing members. This 
hypothesis is tested by reference to a Likert-scale asking people if they agreed or disagreed 
with the following statement: ‘Politicians don’t care what people like me think’ – a measure 
of political cynicism which carries the implication that respondents would like this state of 
affairs to change. The relationship between type of member and this indicator appears in 
Table 5. It confirms H6 since the first-time joiners were much more likely to agree with that 
statement than were existing or returning members. Altogether, just over 40 percent of 
existing members agreed with the proposition, as did 60 percent of returning members and no 
less than 80 percent of the first-time joiners. The latter, in other words, had a much more 
jaundiced view of ‘politics as usual’ than the other party members.  
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
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Having examined each hypothesis separately, we now bring them together in Table 7 
by estimating a multinomial logistic model of membership which compares the first-time 
joiners and the returning members with existing members as the reference category. The 
model contains the predictors associated with the six hypotheses examined earlier, together 
with controls for social background characteristics. It is clear that four variables are 
statistically significant predictors of the two types of new member who joined after the 2015 
election (returning members and first-time joiners) compared to existing members – namely, 
perceptions that politicians do not care, attitudes to Jeremy Corbyn, the left-right ideology 
scale, and age.   
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 The evidence on political cynicism confirms that discontent with ‘politics as usual’ 
was, indeed, one of the key drivers of recruitment to the Labour party during this period.  
First-time joiners, and also returning members, were both more cynical about conventional 
politics and liked Jeremy Corbyn more than the existing members.  In contrast, the returning 
members were ideologically to the left of existing members and first-time joiners. Not 
surprisingly, returning members were older than existing members and first-time joiners were 
younger. The first-time joiners differed from the existing members and returning members in 
that they were less likely to be graduates, but more likely to be low-income graduates and 
also more likely to be female than the other types of members.  
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
It is noteworthy that neither of the direct indicators of relative deprivation, fear of 
poverty and graduate fear of poverty, nor anti-capitalist values, are statistically significant 
predictors in Table 7, and so have no direct influence on membership in the model. Yet they 
do have a powerful indirect influence on membership, as shown in Table 8. The latter 
17 
 
presents the results of an ordered logit regression model of the political cynicism variable, 
which is a powerful predictor in Table 7. To avoid problems of endogeneity in the estimates, 
political cynicism is measured in the 2016 wave of the survey and the predictor variables are 
measured in the 2015 wave. The results show that fear of poverty, graduates’ fear of poverty, 
and anti-capitalist values all had significant influences on political cynicism. Social grade 
also had a marginally statistically significant impact, with low-status individuals being more 
cynical than high-status individuals. Fear of poverty increased political cynicism, although 
graduates who shared this fear were less likely to be cynical. But it is particularly noteworthy 
that anti-capitalist values were strong predictors of political cynicism – so much so that they 
eclipsed ideology in the model.   
Overall, the evidence in Tables 7 and 8 suggests that relative deprivation, including 
graduates who were ‘left behind’, political cynicism and anti-capitalist sentiments all played 
a role, either directly or indirectly, in recruiting new members to the Labour Party during this 
period, particularly when it came to first-time joiners. At the same time, it is clear that 
support for Jeremy Corbyn played a key role in triggering these effects since many of them 
may not have come into play had he not won the leadership. For that reason, in the next 
section we look more closely at the determinants of his support.  
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership and the surge in membership 
In order to look at what helped determine the role played by Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership in 
the Labour surge, we first re-run the models reported in Tables 7 and 8 using support for 
Jeremy Corbyn (measured with a scale running from 0 to 10, where 10 means ‘strongly 
support’) as the dependent variable in an OLS regression with the BES data. We have already 
shown that support for Jeremy Corbyn has been crucial in the decision to join Labour in the 
previous analysis. Table 9 shows that, consistent with our previous hypotheses, being left-
wing and having anti-capitalist values were important factors in explaining support for 
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Jeremy Corbyn, although the latter is only just above the level of statistical significance. In 
line with earlier results, we can also see that those who supported Jeremy Corbyn tended to 
have lower incomes. Thus, it seems that it is the ‘objective’ conditions creating a sense of 
relative deprivation that are more important in influencing positive feelings towards Jeremy 
Corbyn than any subjective fear of poverty. Finally, as we have already seen for first-time 
joiners in the previous model, Corbyn supporters are more likely to be female than male.  
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
Further light can be shed by using the PMP survey fielded in June 2016 which 
captures Labour’s new members, including both first-time joiners and returning members.8 
This dataset makes it possible to gauge in more detail how far those who joined after the 
previous year’s general election expressed support for Corbyn. A total of 1,156 Labour Party 
members who had joined after the 2015 general election were surveyed in May 2016. Of 
these, 13.8% had initially joined as registered supporters before subsequently deciding to 
become full members, and 65.4% joined after Corbyn’s candidacy for the leadership was 
confirmed in June 2015.9 Among other things, respondents were asked a number of questions 
relating to their support for his leadership, including how much of a role it played in their 
decision to join the party. The 2016 data therefore allow us to investigate the earlier 
hypotheses with a particular focus on Corbyn as the new party leader.   
 Logically, we would expect those inspired by the prospect of Corbyn’s leadership to 
have joined the party after his nomination in June 2015.  The BES data cannot investigate this 
issue since wave six of the survey was already completed by the time Corbyn joined the 
leadership race. By contrast, with PMP data we can track respondents who joined before and 
after his official nomination in what amounts to a quasi-experiment (Campbell and Stanley, 
2015). Thus, we can test the following additional hypothesis: 
19 
 
H7: Those who joined the party from June 2015 onwards were more likely to express 
their support for Jeremy Corbyn than those who joined in May 2015. 
 
A final possibility is that a left-wing candidate like Jeremy Corbyn who argues for greater 
action against inequality and material insecurity might be successful in attracting support 
from members from less well-heeled backgrounds. If this is correct, we would expect that 
those who opted to join Labour after June 2015 to have been motivated by economic 
concerns relating to short-term contracts, job insecurity, lower pay, and so on. Accordingly, 
we expect that: 
  
H8: The lower a new member’s income, the more likely they were to express their 
support for Jeremy Corbyn. 
 
 
Results: Explaining support for Jeremy Corbyn  
Using the PMP data, we explain support for Jeremy Corbyn by looking at the relationship 
between the predictors specified in H7 and H8 (timing of membership and income) and three 
different indicators of leadership support, namely a) how important belief in the leadership of 
Jeremy Corbyn was for members’ decisions to join the party, b) how likely they were to vote 
for Jeremy Corbyn if another Labour MP challenged him for the leadership, and c) how likely 
they thought it was that Labour would win the next general election if Corbyn were to remain 
leader.  
With some differences among the three measures of support, the pattern which 
emerges in Table 10 is that the strongest supporters of Jeremy Corbyn tended to have joined 
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after he decided to run in the 2015 leadership election and have household incomes below 
average. Thus, the findings lend support to both Hypotheses 7 and 8. 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 With the aim of creating a more thorough test of these hypotheses, we bring the three 
indicators of support for Jeremy Corbyn together into a single10 highly reliable scale 
(alpha=0.80), which we use as a dependent variable in an OLS model. Table 9 showed that, 
in the BES data, left-wing ideology and anti-capitalist values played key roles in explaining 
support for Jeremy Corbyn. With those results in mind, in Table 11 we specify and test these 
two variables with PMP data, together with additional indicators arising from H7 and H8 
(that is, left-right ideology, anti-capitalist values, time of joining the party, household income, 
plus controls for demographic factors and type of membership). 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results confirm the patterns that emerged in Table 10. Those who joined after June 2015 
were more likely to support Corbyn and generally had lower incomes than other members, 
confirming H7 and H8 in the multivariate model. Not surprisingly, given our previous 
findings, we can also see that Corbyn supporters were more likely to be left-wing, anti-
capitalist, and older – and less likely to be graduates and male –  than other members. We can 
also see that there is no significant difference between first-time joiners and returning 
members in their support for Jeremy Corbyn.   
Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated a number of related hypotheses pertaining to the surge in 
Labour Party membership after May 2015, focussing on two key dependent variables: the 
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type of member (existing, returning or first-time joiner) and support for Jeremy Corbyn as a 
motivation for joining.  
Relative deprivation was plainly a significant factor that drove people, and 
particularly first-time joiners, to join Labour once a candidate with a clear radical profile was 
on the leadership ballot: those who might be labelled ‘left behind’ flocked to Jeremy 
Corbyn’s colours, including graduates earning less than the average income. Anti-capitalist 
values also appeared to be a feature of the new members, as was disenchantment with 
politics-as-usual and a yearning for a new style of politics. But incentives like ideology 
mattered too. Post-2015 recruits who had previously belonged to the Labour Party and who 
re-joined it were more left-wing. Demographic factors played only a limited part in 
understanding Labour’s membership surge, although it looks as if those in lower social 
grades seemed to be more likely than others to be attracted to the party. First-time joiners 
were not, on the whole, university graduates or high income middle-class radicals; rather, 
they looked a little more like the party’s ‘traditional’ grassroots, being less educated and in 
lower status occupations than the existing members. And, although first-time joiners were 
younger than returning members, the average post-2015 recruit is still middle-aged. There 
were also more women among the new recruits, which is interesting and requires further 
investigation. How all these developments affect the party’s policy platform – theoretically 
responsive to its grassroots - is well worth watching. 
We do not examine the role of mobilising organisations such as Momentum in this 
analysis, although it is likely to be an important part of the story about how the surge in 
membership was sustained after Corbyn’s first victory in September 2015. Neither can this 
research tell us whether the remarkable surge in Labour’s membership after 2015 will turn 
out to be a one-time, contingent, never-to-be repeated event, but it affords an important 
insight into its nature and wider debates. One such debate, within the framework of the 
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General Incentives Model (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992), emphasises the importance of 
ideological, expressive and collective policy incentives in motivating members to (re-)join a 
party. The findings of this study re-confirm the importance of all such incentives, among 
other things. 
More generally, our findings may resonate with what some see as a left-wing 
populism that has grown in other established democracies, most notably Podemos in Spain 
and Syriza in Greece, and Bernie Sanders in the USA (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; 
Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 
2017). While Corbynism does not necessarily fit accepted definitions of populism, the Labour 
surge constitutes a powerful case study of the part played by the ‘left-behind’ in explaining 
the growth of left-wing as well as right-wing populism. Both variants appeal to those who 
have been and/or feel ‘left behind’, tapping into widespread distrust of existing political elites 
and articulating anti-corporate and anti-globalisation sentiments. Where the two differ most 
obviously is in their analysis of immigration. Both regard it as a by-product of neoliberal 
globalisation but to right-wingers it is unnecessary, damaging and unwanted, whereas to left-
wingers it requires a generous, progressive and internationalist response. Either way it is 
apparent that social, economic and cultural change since the Great Recession has changed 
politics in Britain as elsewhere, and one of the consequences of this, at least on the left, is to 
create a resurgence of grassroots political activism – one which may well have contributed to 
Labour’s better-than-expected performance at the 2017 general election. Whether or not it 
will help Labour win next time round is an open question, but it is a development which has 
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Figure 1: Membership of UK Political Parties, 2002 to 2018 
 





















Social Grade E 9.0 12.2 10.1 10.4 
D 4.5 6.9 4.8 5.3 
C2 14.2 19.1 9.2 12.5 
C1 19.4 27.7 25.0 24.7 
B 29.9 18.6 29.4 26.8 
A 23.1 15.4 21.6 20.3 
Education Non-Graduate 39.3 59.8 44.4 47.3 
Graduate 60.7 40.2 55.6 52.7 
Gender Female 50.7 49.5 38.5 43.4 
 Male 49.3 50.5 61.5 56.6 
Age up to 25 0.7 5.7 5.7 4.8 
26-35 2.1 6.7 8.5 7.0 
36-45 3.6 18.6 10.3 11.1 
46-55 16.4 19.1 12.0 14.5 
56-65 37.9 30.9 29.8 31.5 
66 plus 39.3 19.1 33.7 31.1 
Source: BES data, 2016. Income χ2= 7.78, p<0.05, Social Grade: χ2= 20.50, p<0.01, Education: 
































   % % % % 
 Income Below Average 
Income (<£25K) 
32.1 42.3 31.1 34.1 
  Above Average                        
Income (>£25K) 
67.9 57.7 68.9 66.0 
 Fear of Poverty Very unlikely Poor 43.2 18.8 33.1 31.6 
 Fairly unlikely Poor 32.4 27.1 33.9 32.0 
 Neither likely  
nor unlikely 
8.1 16.7 14.0 13.6 
 Fairly likely Poor 13.5 22.9 13.2 15.5 
 Very likely Poor 2.7 14.6 5.8 7.3 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: BES data, 2016. χ2 = 14.26 p< (0.07) 
 

















   % % % % 
Graduates Income Below Average 
Income (<£25K) 
30.6 37.2 22.1 26.7 
Above Average                        
Income (>£25K) 
69.4 62.8 77.9 73.3 
Graduates  
Fear of Poverty 
Very Unlikely Poor 21.2 15.4 33.5 27.6 
Fairly Unlikely Poor 31.8 38.5 29.9 31.9 
Neither 25.9 16.7 16.5 18.5 
Fairly Likely Poor 11.8 21.8 11.8 13.7 
Very Likely Poor 9.4 7.7 8.3 8.4 

























Anti-Capitalist Values (3-15) 



















Anti-Capitalist Values (3-15) 
 12.7 14.5 13.2 13.4 
Source: BES data, 2016. Anti-Capitalist Values (F=8.46; p<0.001). Figures of anti-capitalist values 

























Likeability of Jeremy Corbyn (0-10) 
 8.3 7.5 7.1 7.4 
Left/right Ideology Score (0-10) 
 1.6 2.7 2.6 2.4 
Source: BES data, 2016. Type of Membership by Corbyn likeability (F=10.70; p<0.001); ideology 
(F= 5.33; p<0.001); figures of likeability of Jeremy Corbyn indicates mean scores of a scale running 
from 0 (low likeability) to 10 (high likeability); figures of left-right indicates mean scores on self-
location scales running from 0 (left) to 10 (right).  
 






















like me think’ 
Strongly disagree 1.4 1.6 4.4 3.2 
Disagree 15.1 7.3 32.8 23.4 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
23.7 20.7 21.8 21.9 
Agree 40.3 40.9 28.0 33.3 
Strongly agree 19.4 29.5 13.0 18.2 
 Total 100 100 100 100 




Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression Model of Type of Membership 








Like Corbyn .159** .059 1.173 
Left-Right Ideology -.226* .099 .798 
Political cynicism .586*** .117 1.798 
Income .084a .049 1.088 
Fear of Poverty .021 .130 1.022 
Graduate -.035 .341 .965 
Low Income Graduate .442 .433 1.556 
Graduate Fear of Poverty .448 .496 1.565 
Anti-Capitalism Scale -.011 .082 .989 
Social Grade .068 .096 1.070 
Age .034* .011 1.035 
Male -.386 .251 .679 
New Members 
(N=194) 
Like Corbyn .091* .044 1.096 
Left-Right Ideology .117a .069 1.124 
Political cynicism .558*** .102 1.747 
Income .025 .041 1.025 
Fear of Poverty .068 .105 1.070 
Graduate -.762* .308 .467 
Low Income Graduate .662a .400 1.939 
Graduate Fear of Poverty -.157 .441 .855 
Anti-Capitalism Scale -.071 .066 .931 
Social Grade -.050 .081 .951 
Age -.021** .007 .979 
Male -.455* .217 .634 
Source: BES data, 2016. Notes: a=p<0.10, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 





Table 8: Ordered Logit Model of Political Cynicism Measured in 2016 
 B Std. Error 
Like Corbyn -.018 .030 
Left-Right Ideology .041 .048 
Income -.023 .028 
Fear of Poverty .464*** .075 
Graduate .023 .200 
Low Income Graduate .280 .265 
Graduate Fear of Poverty -.551a .298 
Anti-Capitalism .248*** .044 
Social Grade -.091a .056 
Age .001 .005 
Male -.165 .149 
Source: BES data. Notes: a=p>0.10, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
Nagelkerke R-Squared = 0.20. N=791. All predictors are measured in 2015 except for ‘Like Corbyn’ 
 
Table 9: OLS Regression Model of Evaluations of Jeremy Corbyn 
 B Std. Error 
Left-Right Ideology -.542*** .060 
Political Cynicism .076 .086 
Income -.099** .037 
Fear of Poverty -.046 .099 
Graduate -.309 .267 
Low Income Graduate .048 .353 
Graduate Fear of Poverty .545 .395 
Anti-Capitalism .090b .058 
Social Grade .027 .074 
Age .006 .007 
Male -.360a .197 
Source: BES data. Notes: a=p<0.10, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001; b=0.12  
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.18. N=791  
34 
 
Table 10: Evaluations of Jeremy Corbyn 
 
  Joined because of 
belief in leadership  
(7-10) 
Would vote for 
Corbyn if 
challenged in new 
leadership election 
Labour to win next  
election  
(very/ fairly likely) 
  % % % 
  N=1,136 N=1,133 N=994 
Time of 
Joining  
Before Corbyn 53.9 46.2 57.2 
After Corbyn 88.3 74.3 82.1 
χ2  *** *** *** 
 
 
N=987 N=984 N=868 
HH Income Below Average 
Income (<£25K) 
78.5 65.1 74.8 
Above Average 
Income (>£25K) 
71.3 61.6 71.3 
χ2 ** a  
Total  76.5 (N=1,156) 64.4 (N=1,153) 73.2 (N=1,010) 
Source: PMP data. Notes: a=p<0.10, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
Joined because of belief in leadership = ‘How important was belief in the party’s leadership for your 
decision to join the party?’ (0=not important at all, 10=extremely important); figures indicate 
percentages of members who gave a score included between 7 and 10. Would vote for Corbyn = 
percentage indicating that they would certainly vote for Jeremy Corbyn if another Labour MP or MPs 
challenged him for the leadership between now and the next election (other answers: vote for whatever 
candidate challenged Jeremy Corbyn; I would make up my mind depending on who is the challenger). 
Labour to win GE = percentage answering very or fairly likely to the question ‘If Jeremy Corbyn 
remains leader of the Labour party, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that Labour will win the 
next general election?’. Time of joining = percentages of Labour members who joined in May 2015, 
when Jeremy Corbyn was not a candidate in the leadership election, and who joined in/after June 






Table 11 OLS Regression Model of Evaluations of Jeremy Corbyn 
 B Std. Error 
Left-Right Ideology -0.429***  0.048 
Anti-Capitalism 0.277***  0.040 
Joined after JC 1.578***  0.137 
Income -0.044*  0.020 
Graduate Status -0.223a  0.134 
Age 0.041*  0.004 
Male -0.267*  0.130 
First-time joiners (ref: returning members) 0.086  0.147 
Source: PMP data. Notes: a=p<0.10, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.29; N=985 




 https://esrcpartymembersproject.org/  
3
 Note that there were 791 usable cases of Labour Party Members in the 2016 survey; the rest 
were either missing or were members in 2015 and not in 2016.  
4
 The small number of those who were members in 2015 and not in 2016 (N=24) makes it 
impossible to investigate those who left the party as a result of the Corbyn leadership. 
5
 Response categories are ‘Very Unlikely’, ‘Fairly Unlikely’, ‘Neither Unlikely nor Likely’, 
‘Fairly Likely’, ‘Very Likely’. 
6
 Although this measure has some limitations, it is worth noting that some 31 percent of 
respondents who thought that the national economy was doing much better than they were 
also thought that they were very likely to face poverty in the future. In contrast only 16 
percent of people who perceive this gap are not concerned about poverty. This comparison 
captures the difference between the individual and society central to relative deprivation 
theory and suggests that those fearing poverty are quite likely to think of themselves as worse 
off than the rest of the country. 
7
 This impression is reinforced by the qualitative, ‘write-in’ responses of many of those 
surveyed by the PMP in May 2015 who had previously left and re-joined Labour even before 
the post-election leadership contest got underway: their visceral dislike of Blair, both for 
shifting the party away from socialism and for participating in the US-led invasion of Iraq, 
leaps off the page. 
8
 PMP research was made possible by the support of the Economic and Social Research 
Council’s grant ES/M007537/1, which we gratefully acknowledge. 
9
 YouGov recruited the survey respondents from a panel of 300,000 volunteers. Upon joining 
the panel volunteers complete a survey asking a broad range of demographic questions which 
are subsequently used to recruit respondents matching desired demographic quotas for 
surveys. Potential respondents for the party member surveys were identified from questions 
asking individuals if they were members of any of a list of large membership organisations, 
including the parties. Results are not weighted in any way since there are no known official 
population parameters for the various party memberships. However, YouGov’s Labour Party 
membership survey in 2016 using unweighted data generated a prediction for the party 
leadership contests accurate to within 1% of the final official outcome, which gives us 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
10
 We normalise the three items, sum them together and divide them by three. 
